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I am an Assistant Professor in Finance at Imperial College London. Prior to this I was at Tilburg University. I received my PhD from the University of Amsterdam.
My research interests are in financial intermediation, political economy of finance and climate finance. I am a member of Finance Theory Group and a research affiliate at CEPR. I co-organize PolEconFin and the associated CEPR-Stigler Center conference series on the Political Economy of Finance, as well as London FIT Network and Banking Theory Brownbag series. The 5th CEPR-Stilger Center conference on the Political Economy of Finance is scheduled for the 24th of October. The theme is "Governance in a Polarized World" and Prof. Jean Tirole will be our keynote speaker. Submissions close on 22nd of June. Email: [email protected] |
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Publications
Too Levered for Pigou: Carbon Pricing, Financial Constraints and Leverage Regulation
joint with Robin Döttling, forthcoming at the Journal of Financial Economics
my contribution has been prepared under the Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme (ECB)
We analyze optimal carbon pricing under financial constraints and endogenous climate-related transition and physical costs. The socially optimal emissions tax may be above or below a Pigouvian benchmark, depending on the strength of physical climate impacts on pledgeable resources. We derive necessary conditions for emissions taxes alone to implement a constrained-efficient allocation, and show a cap-and-trade system may dominate emissions taxes because it can be designed to have a less adverse effect on financial constraints. We also assess how capital structure, carbon price hedging markets, and socially responsible investors interact with emissions pricing, and evaluate other commonly used policy tools.
The Good, the Bad and the Missed Boom
joint with Enrico Perotti, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 35, Issue 11, November 2022, pages 5025-5056
Some credit booms result in financial crises. While excessive risk taking is a plausible cause, many investors do not anticipate increasing risk. We show that credit booms may be misunderstood as productivity-driven, due to opaque bank assets which disguise risk incentives. Balanced funding relative to productive prospects can sustain prudent lending (good boom), while funding imbalances may induce high risk exposure and boost asset prices (bad boom), or lead to asset under-pricing and insufficient lending (missed boom). Rational agents drawing inference from prices make mistakes that can amplify the effect of funding imbalances and propagate risk.
Working papers
Voting on Public Goods: Citizens vs Shareholders
joint with Robin Döttling, Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, Revise and Resubmit at The Review of Financial Studies
- Link to the Online Appendix
- John L. Weinberg/IRRCI 2025 Research Paper Award
- Selected Presentations: Duke, Holden Conference, OU-RFS Climate and Energy Finance Research Conference (by co-author), WE_ARE Seminar Series VGSF, ESSEC, ASU Sonoran Winter Finance Conference (by co-author), UBC Winter Finance Conference (by co-author), Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance Symposium (by co-author), Adam Smith Workshop (by co-author), EIEF, ABFER (scheduled)
The Political Economy of Prudential Regulation
- 2020 Best Job Market Paper in Finance Theory
- Selected Presentations: FTWebinar, FIRS 2022, OxFit 2021, 7th FIN FIRE Workshop, Swiss Winter Conference on Financial Intermediation "Lenzerheide" 2021, CEPR Advanced Forum in Financial Economics, INSEAD, ECB Young Economist Competition 2020 (poster), ECB DG Research.