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I am a PhD candidate at the Finance Group at Amsterdam Business School, University of Amsterdam, and the Tinbergen Institute.
My research interest are in banking, macro-finance and political economy. I will be available for interviews at the 2020 AFA Annual Meeting in San Diego and the 2019 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society in Rotterdam. |
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References
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Enrico Perotti
University of Amsterdam |
Guillermo Ordoñez
University of Pennsylvania |
Toni Ahnert
Bank of Canada |
Job Market Paper
The Political Economy of Prudential Regulation
This paper studies the equilibrium level of prudential regulation in a setting in which pecuniary externalities lead to overborrowing. A debt limit is implemented by a politician appointed through majoritarian elections. As voting allows borrowers to internalize the externality, the regulation restores constrained efficiency whenever the politician can commit to enforce it universally. Under selective enforcement, captured regulator may exempt politically connected borrowers from regulation. Depending on the electoral power of the connected, the outcome may be an either too lax or too strict policy. The analysis deepens the understanding of the role of political economy factors in affecting equilibrium regulation. Additional results highlight the impact of income inequality on strictness of the policy.