|
I am an Assistant Professor in Finance at Imperial College London. Prior to this I was at Tilburg University. I received my PhD from the University of Amsterdam.
My research interests are in financial intermediation, political economy of finance and climate finance. I am a member of Finance Theory Group and a research affiliate at CEPR. I co-organize PolEconFin and the associated CEPR-Stigler Center conference series on the Political Economy of Finance, as well as London FIT Network and Banking Theory Brownbag series. Email: [email protected] |
|
Publications
Voting on Public Goods: Citizens vs Shareholders
joint with Robin Döttling, Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, conditionally accepted at The Review of Financial Studies
John L. Weinberg/IRRCI 2025 Research Paper Award
We study the interplay between a ``one person-one vote’’ political system and a ``one share-one vote” corporate governance regime. If shareholders push firms for more pro-social policies, political backlash may arise, undoing these initiatives. If public policy is frictionless, shareholder democracy becomes irrelevant: the political system fully offsets shareholder influence. With public policy frictions, pro-social corporations can mitigate regulatory shortcomings and enhance corporate public goods provision. Nevertheless, shareholder democracy can hurt citizens due to the representation problem: it favors the preferences of the wealthy. Investor diversification, pass-through voting, and corporate greenwashing have important implications for these trade-offs of shareholder democracy.
Link to the Online Appendix
Link to the Online Appendix
Too Levered for Pigou: Carbon Pricing, Financial Constraints and Leverage Regulation
joint with Robin Döttling, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 172, October 2025, 104105
my contribution has been prepared under the Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme (ECB)
We analyze optimal carbon pricing under financial constraints and endogenous climate-related transition and physical costs. The socially optimal emissions tax may be above or below a Pigouvian benchmark, depending on the strength of physical climate impacts on pledgeable resources. We derive necessary conditions for emissions taxes alone to implement a constrained-efficient allocation, and show a cap-and-trade system may dominate emissions taxes because it can be designed to have a less adverse effect on financial constraints. We also assess how capital structure, carbon price hedging markets, and socially responsible investors interact with emissions pricing, and evaluate other commonly used policy tools.
The Good, the Bad and the Missed Boom
joint with Enrico Perotti, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 35, Issue 11, November 2022, pages 5025-5056
Some credit booms result in financial crises. While excessive risk taking is a plausible cause, many investors do not anticipate increasing risk. We show that credit booms may be misunderstood as productivity-driven, due to opaque bank assets which disguise risk incentives. Balanced funding relative to productive prospects can sustain prudent lending (good boom), while funding imbalances may induce high risk exposure and boost asset prices (bad boom), or lead to asset under-pricing and insufficient lending (missed boom). Rational agents drawing inference from prices make mistakes that can amplify the effect of funding imbalances and propagate risk.
Working papers
The Political Economy of Prudential Regulation
- 2020 Best Job Market Paper in Finance Theory
- Selected Presentations: FTWebinar, FIRS 2022, OxFit 2021, 7th FIN FIRE Workshop, Swiss Winter Conference on Financial Intermediation "Lenzerheide" 2021, CEPR Advanced Forum in Financial Economics, INSEAD, ECB Young Economist Competition 2020 (poster), ECB DG Research.